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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LEROY NEWBILL,
Plaintiff,

vs.
JOHN A. HENDRICKS, as Judge of
the District Court of the Second
Judicial District in and for the
County of Weber, State of Utah,
Defendant.

Case No.

7251

Brief of Respondent

The facts before this Honorable Court are not in
dispute and have been fairly and accurately set forth
in Plaintiff's Brief; however, it is the position of the
respondent that the Justice of the Peace had jurisdiction
of the cause and that the petitioner has a, plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy at Jaw. Wherefore, the Peremptory Writ of Prohibition issued by this Honorable Court
should be set aside and the petition or application of the
plain tiff dismissed.
1
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ASSERTION NO. 1
THE JUSTICE'S COURT HAD JURISDICTION.
In his brief in support of application, plaintiff
makes one statement of error, as follows:
'' The District Judge, defendant herein, erred
in denying plaintiff's motion to quash and to dismiss the complaint.''
The complaint, which is incorporated by reference as
exhibit "A" to plaintiff's application for Writ of Prohibition before this Honorable Court is : ''In the Justices'
Court of The Precinct of Burch Creek, County of Weber,
State of Utah.'' It charges the plaintiff, Leroy Newbill,
with the commission of a misdemeanor in the aforesaid
county and state, in that on or about the 24th day of
July 1948, he unlawfully kept intoxicating liquor for the
purpose of sale, contrary to the provisions of 46-0-156,
Utah Code Annotated 1943. There is, therefore, no dispute but that the misdemeanor was allegedly committed
within the county of Weber. Said county embraces
Burch Creek Precinct.
Section 20-5-4, Utah Code Annotated 1943, reads in
part as follows :
"Justices' courts have jurisdiction of the following public offenses committed within the
respective counties in whirh such courts are established:
( 3) Breaches of the peace, committing a willfull injury to property, and all misdemeanors
punishable by a fine less than $300 or by imprison-
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ment in the county jail or municipal prison not
exceeding six months, or by both such fine and
imprisonment.''
The Code of Criminal Procedure, through section
105-57-1, directs :
''In criminal cases the jurisdiction of justices
of the peace extends to the limits of their respectiYe counties.''
There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure requiirng that the place of trial be established in
the precinct from which the justice is elected or appointed. There is provision by section 105-57-12 that the defendant, by affidavit stating that he has reason to believe he cannot have a fair and impartial trial before the
justice about to try the same, may have the action transferred to a justice of the county agreed upon by the
parties.
This court in State vs. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114
Pac. (2) 1034, at page 1042 of the Pacific, has held tha.t
the question of venue may be waived.
A consideration of the remarks of this honorable
court in Dillard vs. District Court of Salt Lake County,
69 Utah 10, 251 Pac. 1070, leads to the conclusion that subparagraph 3 of section 20-5-4, Utah Code Annotated
1943 (supra) was adopted to avoid confusion concerning
the jurisdiction of justices' courts. The case discloses :
''In the year 1925, the Legislature, by chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1925, passed an act entitled
'an act to amend section 1784, Compiled Laws of
9
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Utah 1917, relating to the criminal jurisdiction of
justice's court, where in and whereby the jurisdiction of justices' courts over public offenses
was limited to those committed within their respective precincts or citie~ in which such courts
are established.''
This court stated at page 1072 of the Pacific:
"Other objections to the statute in question
are that it produces confusion and derangement
in criminal practice and procedure in justices'
courts, and is inconsistent with other statutory
provisions. There can be no doubt of this consequence. The system of procedure in such courts as
established by law is in many respects adjusted
to and dependent upon, the existence of a territorial jurisdiction coextensive with the county. It
is suggested that the restricted jurisdiction will in
effect render nugatory the statute providing for
the change in the place of trial on the ground of
prejudice, because there will be no justice out of
the precinct with jurisdiction to whom the action
can be transferred; and that, in a case where the
precinct justice is himself accused, or is disabled
by sickness, or is disqualified by interest or relationship to the accused person, of occurring in one
of the numerous counties having no city courts,
there would be no other court with jurisdiction
before whom the action could be commenced or
treid. Other similar objections along this line are
made. It is apparent that the statute was passed
without consideration of these consequences. But
these are not judicial questions, and we may not
upon such grounds declare the act invalid. The
evils must be corrected, if at all, by the Legislature.''
4
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The Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, as officially
adopted and published, amended jurisdictional provisions of section 20-5-4 and reestablished jurisdiction of
the Justices' courts over offenses committed within the
respective counties. On page 379 of the revision the following note appears:
''The text of this section is a restoration of
the law as it existed prior to the amendment by
La,Ys, 1925, Chap. 62, which limited the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in criminal cases to
offenses committed within their respectiv precincts or cities, thus rendering conviction f.or a
misdemeanor committeed in a precinct other than
that of the place of trial a nullity. Dillard v. District Court, 251 P. 1070, 69 U. 10."
There can be no doubt that the complaint was
properly issued and the justice's court of the precinct of
Burch Creek had jurisdiction over the subject matter;
and that upon the arrest of the accused, jurisdiction
existed over the person of I.Jeroy Newbill, the appellant
or petitioner herein. Any irregularity occurring thereafter may have been raised upon appeal as provided by
law, or by application to the District Court upon collateral attack as provided and authorized under the provisions of Article 8, Section 7 of the Constitution of the
State of Utah, which provides as follows:
''The District Court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and crimnal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not :f>rohibited
by law; appellate jurisdiction from all inferior
courts and tribunals, and a supervisory control of
the same. The district Courts or any judge there.of, shall have power to issue writs of habeas:
5
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corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition and other writs necessary to
carry into effect their orders, judgments and decrees, and to give them a general control over inferior courts and tribunals within their respective
jurisdictions.''
There are authorities which hold that a justice of
the peace is a precinct officer and may not carry his
court like a personal chattel outside of the district from
which he was appointed. See Cox vs. Perkins, 299 Ky.
470, 185 S.W. (2) 954, wherein the Kentucky court so
held. However, it is to be_ noted that this case concerns
an action brought directly against the justice of the
peace and does not concern appellate action in direct
attack upon his irregular exercise of jurisdiction. The
Kentucky court held that the justice had no power to act
beyond his territorial precinct, township or jurisdiction.
The same result was reached in Ex parte Robinson, 56
Oklahoma Criminal 404, 41 Pac. (2) 127; and Harrington vs. State, 66 Oklahoma Criminal 310, 91 Pac. ( 2) 787.
The Robinson case, supra, is reported as a habeas corpus
proceeding wherein the petitioner claimed that he was
unlawfully convicted of murder because of a denial of a
preliminary hearing, in that the justice of the peace who
conducted the preliminary hearing acted in the incorporated town of Konavva, Oklahoma, whereby he was elected and appointed a justice of the peace of Konawa township district which was beyond the limits of the town.
The Harrington case would also appear to be quite directly in point and involves a violation of liquor control
lR\YS of the state of Oklahoma. Yet, it is to be noted that
6
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in the Harrington case (upon appeal and application for
dismissal) the complaint itself was issued by a justice
of the peace who, at the time of issuing the complaint,
was not within his territorial limits as such.
Other cases hereinafter eited hold that 1n the absence of express statutory limits, where jurisdiction runs
within the county of commission, it is only required that
trial be held somewhere "'\\Tithin the county. See Antilla
vs. Justice's Court of Big River Township, 209 Cal. 621,
290 Pac. 43. See also ex parte Cohen, 107 Cal. App. 288,
290 Pac, 512; State vs. Bunke, 113 Ore. 523, 233 Pac. 538;
and State vs. Maughn, 35 Utah 426, 100 Pac. 934. Under
provisions of legislative authorization and the authorities
of this honorable court, the Justice of the Peace of Burch
Creek Precinct had jurisdiction over the offense and although the arraignment of the accused was conducted
beyond his precinct and the sentence issued, jurisdiction
was not to be nullified. In the event this court should
decide that a justice of the peace cannot conduct trial
any place within the county but is limited to the precinct of his appointment, nevertheless we submit that an
abuse of process or irregularity in proceedings would not
thereby deprive the Court of jurisdiction but would only
be grounds for appeal, or in the event that an appeal
does not afford a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
give rise to entitlement to an extraordinary writ applied
for and issued directly to the justice in question.
Plaintiff, by his application for Writ of Prohibition
before this honorable court, would elect that the district
7
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court, on appeal, erred in not disnvissing arnd quashing
the complaint. It is the position of the respondent herein
that the District Court, on appeal, properly denied such
a motion. If the motion were granted there would be no
complaint before the justice's court and no further proceedings to be heard in the district court. The-re is no
assignment before this honorable court to the effect that
the complaint was not properly issued by the Justice
of the Peace of Burch Creek Precinct. The only error
assigned is that he held court outside of his territorial
limits.
ASSERTION NO. 2
THE DISTRICT COURT, DEFENDANT HEREIN, IS NOT IN E:aROR.
,In his brief, counsel for the applicant, Leroy Newbill,
states that an appeal from the action of the Justice's
Court was filed with the District Court in and for the
County of Weber. The provisions of section 105-57-38,
Utah Code Annotated 1943, read as follows:
''Any defendant in a criminal action tried before a justice of the peace may appeal from the
final judgment therein to the district court of the
county where~ the court of such justice is held at
any time within 30 days from the entry of the
judgment.''
On the final page of his brief, counsel submits that the
plaintiff was entitled. to have the complaint dismissed on
motion, under the provisions of section 105-57-44, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943, '\\7hich- reads in part :
8
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'·The complaint on motion of the defendant
may be dismissed upon the following grounds :
(1) That the justice did not havH jurisdiction of the offense.''
Again we respectfully assert that there is no doubt
of the jurisdiction of the J ustiee of Burch Creek or any
other justice of the County of Weber, over the offense
allegedly committed in said county. No application was
made to the defendant, District Court, the respondent
herein, for collateral proceedings against the judgment
entered by the justice, rather plaintiff follows statutory
procedure by direct appeal. He does not, in his appeal,
request that the judgment of the justice be set aside but
rather, claims a lack of jurisdiction. The District Court
correctly ruled that the motion to dismiss be denied and
that the defendant be required to appear upon a future
day certain and plead to the charge. in anticipation of
trial de novo. As indicated by Chief Justice Pratt of this
honorable court, in his reasoning concerning the merits of
petition for prohibition in the case of Robinson vs. City
of Ogden, ______ Utah ______ , 185 Pac. (2) 256 at page. 26-3,
had the defendant judge of the District Court granted
the motions of the plaintiff there would riot only be a
dismissal of the appeal but also a dismissal of the action
''leaving nothing against petitioner in either court.'' The
District Judge refuses to dismiss since the matter is properly before him on appeal and orders a trial de novo;
then the plaintiff, Leroy Newbill, decides that his appeal
will leave him in the same position perhaps as we was
before the Justice Court; it is then he appears before this
9
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honorable court, claiming that he is entitled to a Writ of
Prohibition enjoining the District Judge from proceeding and taking the· action contemplated by appeal. The
position of the plaintiff is most waivering.
ASSERTION NO. 3
THE DISTRICT COURT ACQUIRED ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION.
Plaintiff invoked jurisdiction of the District Court
, and the action of the court ma.y not now be- set aside by
Writ of Prohibition upon the petition of the plaintiff.
The question of original jurisdicton of .the District Court
over misdemeanors triable before a justice of the peace
was reached in State vs. Ferguson, 83 Utah 357, 28 Pa.c.
(2) 175 and in the case of State vs. Telford, 95 Utah 228,
72 Pac. (2) 626. Mr. Justice Wolfe, speaking for this
honorable court, stated:
"If the district court does proceed where it is
shown that the matter was improperly transferred, certainly the party requesting that it should
so proceed cannot question what he consented to
and requested. He is barred from asserting that
the jurisdiction "ras not invoked, not because the
court properly assumed it, but because estoppel
holds up its hand and says, 'You shall not assert
that its jurisdiction is improperly invoked.' If
he cannot assert such lack of proper procedure,
it is as to him as if it had been proper. There is a
vast difference betV\7 een something being correct
and proper, and a situation where it is not but the
facts are such that the court pulls down the curtain on the contemplated assertion that it was not
proper because of the principle of estoppal.-"

10
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And again ~fr. Justice Wolfe in the same case states:
''Therefore, it must be assumed as far as the
defendant is concerned that it did come up from
an appeal, which 'vas the only other way it could
properly come up. Thus, the jurisdiction of the
district court is final unless a constitutional question is involved.
''In such case the appeal of this court should
be dismissed rather than the judgment affirmed.
Affirmance takes in the inference that an appeal
to this court lies. Dismissal of the appeal infers a
holding that no appeal alies and assigned errors
cannot be reviewed. We take cognizance of the
record in so far as to determine that the. case so
stipulated into the district court was wrong, invoke the principle of estoppel against the appellant, which results in a situation of the defendant
having had a final hearing in the district court.
The record revealing this, we should on our own
motion dismiss on the ground that defendant has
no right of appeal to this court. We cannot consider assigned error and thus, by inference, hold
that there is a right of appeal.''
In the case of State vs. Johnson, 100 Utah 316, 114
Pac. (2) 1034, 1\Ir. Justice Larson distinguishes, in an·
able treatise, between original and derivative jurisdiction and quotes from the case In re B-urnette, 73 Kan.
609, 85 Pac. 575, as follows:
''The jurisdiction to consider and decide
causes de novo is in its essence original. The
manner in which a cast reaches the higher court is
not the test. Jurisdiction being the power to hear
and determine, the nature of the functions to be
exercised controls whether they are brought into
activity by primary process or by removal from
11
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an inferior tribunal. Upon a trial de novo the
power of an appellate court in dealing with the
pleadings and the evidence in the application of
the law and in the rendition of judgment according to the right of the case, all independent of the
action of the lower court, is no different from
what it would be if the case were begun there originally, and hence is not 'appellate,' within the
meaning of laws creating jurisdiction. Lacy v.
williams, 27 Mo. 280; County of St. Louis v.
Sparks, 11 Mo. (201) 203."
He further states in the Johnson case at page 1042
of the Pacific :
''In cases in personam, the· question of venue
may be waived. It is a right personal to the defendant to have his cause tried in the court of
proper venue, but if he willingly submits the
matter to a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action he is bound by the verdict or the judgment. Objections to venue in cases
in personam must be raised or will be held to have
been waived. ''The right to apply for a change of
venue is waived by failure to apply therefor at
the time and in the manner prescribed by law.''
67 C. J. 219; 27 R.C.L·. 819. 'It may be waived by
certain acts of perticipation in_ the proceedings,
or by filing a demurrer." 67 C. J. 202. 'To be
effective an objection to the venue must be seasonably made or it will be waived.' It 'must be made
at or before filing a demurrer, or answering to the
merits.' 67 C.J. 89; 27 R.C.L. 784. It has been
held that the objection may be made at the trial
but not after the introduction of evidence, and it
is too late after verdict or judgment. Howland v.
Sheriff of Queens County, 7 N.Y. Super. Ct. 219;
Draper v. Kirkland, 1 Head, Tenn., 260; Howe v.
Hatley, 186 Ark. 366, 54 S.W. 2d 64; Newcomer v.

12
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Sheppard, 31 Okl. 335, 152 P. 66; Johnston v.
Wadsworth, 24 Or. 494, 34 P. 13; State v. Lehman,
18:2 ~[o. 424, 81 S. "\V. 1118, 66 L.R.A. 490, 103
...-\m. St. Rep. 670. ',
The concurring opinions of

~Jr.

Justice Wolfe and Jus-

tice Pratt in the same case substantiate the position
of the respondent in every particular and support the
action of the District Judge, respondent herein.
It is difficult for counsel for the respondent to see
how and in what manner the plaintiff has been prejudiced by the action of the District Judge, since in a trial
de novo, it is possible that he
acquitted and released.

may have

been

How and in what manner

may it now be established that he had no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy at

law~

To grant the writ

as requested by the plaintiff' would absolve him from
responsibility before the law since he would have this
court order the District Judge to dismiss the complaint.
Section 105-57-43, Utah Code Annotated 1943 provides
that an appeal, duly perfected from the justice's court,
transfers the action to the District Court for trial anew.
The authority of the justice to take further steps in the
matter is to be terminated, yet the record shows that
after filing his appeal, plaintiff filed his motion to quash
and dismiss.
See 31 Am. Juris. 728, Justices of the Peace, para. 37.
13
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CONCLUSION
In summarization, cousel for respondent submit that
the Justice of the Peace of Burch Creeks had jurisdiction
of the offense charged; that having acquired jurisdiction lawfully and regularly through a complaint regularly issued, the Justice's Court would not lose jurisdiction or entitle the accused to a dismissal because of the
fact he was arraigned and sentenced without the territorial limits of the precinct from which the complaint
issued.
Further, having involved the jurisdiction of the District Court by his own application, plaintiff now attempts to divest the court of jurisdiction by Writ of
Prohibition. No error of record has been committed by
the District Court. Plaintiff has not exhausted his remedy at law. Therefore the Peremptory Writ of Prohibition, issued by this honorable court, should in all justice
be set aside and the writ cancelled ab initio.
Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
ANDREW JOHN BRENNAN,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendarnt
and Respondent.
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